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I. INTRODUCTION
Can businesses effectively regulate the behavior of their employees, and if
so, what strategies should they use to best achieve that goal? Recent corporate
scandals have evoked a heightened concern among members of the public, gov-
ernment officials, and business leaders about both whether businesses can regulate
the conduct of their employees, and how to effectively secure employee adherence
with corporate rules and policies. White collar crime is again on the public agenda.
White collar crime is crime committed by employees in for-profit companies to
benefit either their companies or themselves. White collar crime has two principal
characteristics. First, white collar criminals are typically well educated, employed,
middle class and, at least historically, white males. Second, the crimes they commit
tend to be nonviolent and to focus on monetary gain. The crimes involved are not
emotionally driven, such as assault or rape, nor do they involve physical harm.
Instead, they are efforts by individuals to achieve economic rewards outside the
framework of the law.
Business-related criminal behavior is a key regulatory issue because if corpora-
tions are unable to effectively manage the lawfulness of their conduct, the gov-
ernment has a reason to heighten external legal regulation.
What can be done to minimize the likelihood of unlawful behavior in the world
of for-profit organizations and corporate regulation? In this analysis, I argue for
the importance of values, in particular legitimacy, as a central feature of the law,
particularly in relation to the regulation of business. I focus on why legitimacy is
often undermined and, conversely, how it can be more effectively maintained.
First, legitimacy is important for internal regulation, as businesses with ethical
cultures that are legitimate to employees are less likely to engage in wrongdoing.
Second, legitimacy is also important for external regulation because it is central to
people's willingness to obey the law, and follow the policies and practices imposed
on for-profit organizations by legal authorities.
This article will address the advantages of legitimacy as the central element in a
regulatory strategy. I argue that legitimacy is a better strategy than the command
and control approach widely used today, but that it is difficult to implement be-
cause the approaches to governing and exercising legal authority that most ef-
fectively build and maintain legitimacy run counter to the intuitions and prefer-
ences of many people in positions of authority.
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II. Is LEGITIMACY A DESIRABLE FRAMEWORK FOR LAW?
The central question in discussions about regulation is whether governance via
legitimacy is a desirable and effective approach. And if governance by legitimacy
is a desirable approach, then why is it so hard to achieve? In particular, why
do societies keep moving toward the use or threat of force, particularly during
times of crisis? Why, for example, did the United States respond to the events of
September 11, 2001 with widespread repressive policies toward suspect groups, in
particular the members of the American Muslim community?' And why did the
British respond in similar ways to the same problem in the United Kingdom? 2
Similarly, why is the orientation of law and legal authorities toward corporations
and their leaders in the wake of recent issues of malfeasance one of threat and
potential sanctioning? While they involve different issues, these two government
responses are similar in that both involve a reaction to wrongdoing that is framed
in terms of the threat of punishment and directed at a suspect group. I will argue
that there are several reasons related to the nature of the psychology associated
with legal authority and its implementation.
A. Legitimacy
First, it is important to define legitimacy, and we can do so only through a
discussion of power. Power is the ability to shape others' gains and losses either
by using threats or coercion to deter undesired behavior, or by promising re-
wards to promote desired behavior. A core aspect of social dynamics, therefore, is
that power provides a means to shape behavior with the consequence that "the
strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."3 The argument that
behavior in social settings is linked to the ability to reward and punish is also
influential in political science, sociology, and economics, as well as in law, public
policy, and management.
It is equally important, however, that under some circumstances, people are
also influenced by others because they believe that the decisions made and rules
enacted by others are in some way "right" or "proper" and ought to be followed.'
In other words, people "relate to the powerful as moral agents as well as self-
interested actors; they are cooperative and obedient on grounds of legitimacy as
well as reasons of prudence and advantage."5 Legitimacy is the belief that those in
1. See Tom R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counter-
terrorism Policing: A Study ofMuslim Americans, 44 LAW & Soc'y REv. 365, 366 (2010).
2. See Aziz Z. Huq, Tom R. Tyler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation in
Counterterrorism Policing: Evidence from the United Kingdoms, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STuD. 728, 730 (2011).
3. THUCYDIDES, THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THUCYDIDES: THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 331 (Richard Crawley
trans., Random House 1951).
4. See DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGmMATION OF POWER (1991).
5. Id. at 27.
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power deserve to rule and make decisions influencing the lives of everyone,6
and the perception that they "ought to be obeyed."7 In work settings, legitimacy
refers to the judgment that "the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and
definitions."
While legitimacy and power or coercion can be distinguished conceptually,
in reality they often co-exist. Companies have both norms about what is right or
proper and penalties and rewards for rule-breaking and rule-following. Hence, it is
seldom the case that only one of these mechanisms exists within an organizational
setting. What is crucial is the balance between them.
It may not be necessary for legal authorities to have legitimacy to achieve
compliance, but it is nonetheless important. While some argue that it is impossible
to maintain social order using only power and others suggest that it is possible but
more difficult, it is generally agreed that legal authorities benefit from having
legitimacy and that they find governance easier and more effective when there is a
widespread feeling that they are entitled to define and enforce rules of conduct.9
This is equally true of managerial authorities.
Seeking to gain influence over others based solely on the possession of power
requires enormous expenditures of resources to create a credible system of
surveillance through which authorities monitor public behavior to punish rule
violators. In addition, resources must be available to provide incentives for desired
behavior such as cooperation and rewarding people for acting in ways that benefit
the authorities and the community. Recent empirical research suggests that these
strategies of governance and management can be successful. For example, recent
research suggests that deterrence strategies can shape crime related behavior,'o but
that the magnitude of that deterring influence is usually small if not non-existent."
The use of power, particularly coercive power, thus requires a large expenditure of
resources to obtain modest and limited amounts of influence over others. 12
6. HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE 55-56 (1989).
7. Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 INT'L ORG. 379, 381 (1999); see Sherrie E.
Human & Keith G. Provan, Legitimacy Building in the Evolution of Small-Firm Multilateral Networks: A
Comparative Study of Success and Demise, 45 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 327, 328-29 (2000).
8. Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
571, 574 (1995).
9. Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 377
(2006).
10. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 46-47 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978); Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal
Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 2 (1998).
11. See Anthony Bottoms & Andrew von Hirsch, The Crime-Preventive Impact of Penal Sanctions, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 96, 121 (Peter Cane & Hebert M. Kritzer eds., 2010);
Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 765, 818 (2010).
12. See id.
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This is not to say, of course, that deterrence is irrelevant. We do not know
how much illegal behavior would occur if companies believed that they could
commit fraud or engage in other forms of illegal behavior with no risk of being
caught and punished. Conversely, sanctions are often ineffective because society
does not put sufficient resources into surveillance and enforcement to make the
risks of rule-breaking credible.13 If sufficient resources were allocated to that
purpose, sanctions might more strongly influence behavior.14
In a review of the literature on American drug use, for example, a study of
existing research found that only approximately five percent of the variance in
drug use can be explained by individual judgments of the likelihood of being
caught and punished by the police and courts. 5 This conclusion is typical of the
findings of studies of compliance with the law-deterrence is found to have, at
best, a small influence on people's behavior.16
More general reviews of deterrence research conclude that the relationship
between risk judgments and crime is "modest to negligible"17 and that the "per-
ceived certainty [of punishment] plays virtually no role in explaining deviant/
criminal conduct."' 8 According to Piquero, Paternoster, Pogarsky, and Laughran, a
review of the literature results in "some studies finding that punishment weakens
compliance, some finding that sanctions have no effect on compliance, and some
finding that the effect of sanctions depends on moderating factors."' 9 Even studies
on the most severe form of punishment-the death penalty-suggest that the
argument that capital punishment deters crime "still lacks clear proof' because
studies have failed to produce compelling evidence that executions influence the
rate of crime.20
Studies on punishment suggest that it is not only an ineffective deterrent for
society at large, but it is also minimally, if at all, effective in deterring the
future criminal conduct of those being punished. Widespread punishment for
minor crimes does not generally lower the rate of subsequent criminal behavior,
13. See Paternoster, supra note 11, at 819.
14. Id.
15. Robert J. MacCoun, Drugs and the Law: A Psychological Analysis of Drug Prohibition, 113 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 497, 501 (1993).
16. See Paternoster, supra note 11, at 818.
17. Travis C. Pratt et al., The Empirical Status of Deterrence Theory: A Meta-Analysis, in TAKING STOCK:
THE STATUS OF CRiMINOLOGIcAL THEORY 367, 383 (Francis T. Cullen et al. eds., 2006).
18. Raymond Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect of the Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment: A
Review of the Evidence and Issues, 4 JusT. Q. 173, 191 (1987).
19. Alex R. Piquero et al., Elaborating the Individual Difference Component in Deterrence Theory, 7 ANN.
REv. LAw & Soc. Sci. 335, 335 (2011); see also Paternoster, supra note 11, at 818.
20. Robert Weisburg, The Death Penalty Meets Social Science: Deterrence and Jury Behavior Under New
Scrutiny, I ANN. REv. LAw & Soc. Sci. 151, 163 (2005); see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE
AND THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (Daniel S. Nagin & John V. Pepper eds., 2012).
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as models of specific deterrence would predict.2 1 Similarly, studies of more severe
punishment like imprisonment report that more severe punishments are unrelated
to lower rates of future criminality. 22 In fact, studies of juveniles suggest that
incarceration actually increases the likelihood of later criminality. 23
While the previously mentioned studies refer to the effectiveness of deterrence
and sanctioning generally, studies specifically focused on white collar crime yield
similar results.24 Braithwaite and Makkai studied compliance among nursing
home executives and concluded that there were no significant deterrence effects;
in other words, whether the law was followed was not related to perceptions of
the likelihood of being caught and punished for breaking the law. 2 5 Experiments in
which participants indicated their likelihood of engaging in wrongdoing given
different fact scenarios that varied the likelihood of being caught similarly did not
find deterrence effects on people's decisions about how to act under different
conditions.2 6 In three studies on cooperation and employee conduct, I interviewed
employees concerning their rule-breaking behaviors and their estimates of the
likelihood of being caught and punished for wrongdoing, and examined the
influence of employees' judgments of risk of detection and punishment.2 7 The
studies found minimal deterrence effects on employees' rule-following behavior.2 8
Reviewing this evidence, Simpson described evidence supporting the existence of
deterrent effects in corporate settings as "equivocal." 2 9 As noted, sanctions do not
21. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING
109-10 (2001); Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York and a
Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 316 (2006).
22. Mark W. Lipsey & Francis T. Cullen, The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: A Review of
Systematic Reviews, 3 ANN. REV. LAW & Soc. Sci. 297, 302 (2007).
23. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE 5, 152-153, 192, 201 (Joan McCord
et al. eds., 2001).
24. See, e.g., Mark A. Huselid, The Impact of Human Resource Management Practices on Turnover, Pro-
ductivity, and Corporate Financial Performance, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 635 (1995) (studying impact of deterrent
management practices on behavior in an office environment). See generally G. Douglas Jenkins, Jr. et al., Are
Financial Incentives Related to Performance?: A Meta-Analytic Review of Empirical Research, 83 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 777 (1998) (studying the effect of financial deterrents on office behavior).
25. John Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence, 25 LAW &
Soc'y REv. 7, 35 (1991).
26. See Paul Jesilow, Gilbert Geis & Mary Jane O'Brien, "Is My Battery Any Good?": A Field Test ofFraud in
the Auto Repair Business, 8 J. CRIME & JUST. 1, 14 (1985); Paul Jesilow, Gilbert Geis & Mary Jane O'Brien,
Experimental Evidence That Publicity Has No Effect in Suppressing Auto Repair Fraud, 70 Soc. & Soc. REs. 222,
222-23 (1986).
27. Tom R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE 51-65 (2011); [hereinafter TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE];
Tom R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS 45-49 (2000) [hereinafter TYLER & BLADER,
COOPERATION IN GROUPS]; Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Can Businesses Effectively Regulate Employee
Conduct?, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1143, 1153 (2005) [hereinafter Tyler & Blader, Can Businesses Effectively
Regulate Employee Conduct?].
28. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE, supra note 27, at 51-65; TYLER & BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS,
supra note 27, at 45-49; Tyler & Blader, Can Businesses Effectively Regulate Employee Conduct?, supra note 27,
at 1153.
29. SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 42 (2002).
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have a particularly powerful impact, although researchers often note that it is
difficult to actually monitor behavior.o
In addition to punishment, researchers have also considered the role of incen-
tives in organizational contexts.3 1 Based upon a workplace-based study in which
employees were interviewed about the risk of punishment and possibilities of
reward for different types of workplace behavior, Tyler and Blader estimated that
around ten percent of the variance in employee behavior is shaped by incentives in
the work environment.3 2 These results suggest that, while they are somewhat
effective, incentive systems also only have a limited impact on employee behavior.
In recent years, the limits of the utilitarian command and control model,
which seeks to implement regulations through sanctions and incentives, have
been emphasized in work settings. 33 In the legal literature on government regula-
tion, skepticism surrounding command and control strategies has led to the
flourishing of market-based models of regulation that emphasize economic incen-
tive systems.3 4
The same research shows that changes in behavior motivated by promised
incentives or threatened sanctions come at high material costs because they require
either the provision of resources for surveillance or the widespread use of
incentives. This leaves societies vulnerable, because disruptions in the control of
resources brought on by periods of scarcity or conflict quickly lead to the collapse
of effective social order when that social order is only based upon power.3 ' When
the public views law and legal authorities as legitimate, however, social order has
an alternative basis for support during difficult times. It is precisely in times of
economic crisis that legal authorities both most need the support of those they seek
to regulate and are least able to either provide incentives or effectively enforce
sanctions.
Further, when legal authorities can call upon the values of the regulated group to
encourage desired behavior, either because of an internal ethical culture or because
of the legitimacy of legal authorities, society has more flexibility in how it deploys
30. See Donald C. Larigevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law,
2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 71, 72.
31. See Tyler & Blader, Can Businesses Effectively Regulate Employee Conduct, supra note 27, at 1153.
32. See TYLER & BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS, supra note 27, at 47-48; see also Philip M. Podsakoff
et al., Relationships Between Leader Reward and Punishment Behavior and Subordinate Attitudes, Perceptions,
and Behaviors: A Meta-Analytic Review of Existing and New Research, 99 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSEs 113, 135 (2006) (finding similar results).
33. See, e.g., David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a "Reinvented" State/Federal
Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 109-114 (2000); Jon G.
Sutinen & K. Kuperan, A Socio-Economic Theory of Regulatory Compliance, 26 INT'L J. Soc. EcoN. 174, 186-88
(1999). See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2385 (1997) (examining
problems with deterrence through an economic framework).
34. See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437, 450-51
(2003).
35. Tyler, supra note 9, at 377.
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its resources. In particular, it is better able to use collective resources to benefit the
long-term interests of the law since they are not immediately required to ensure
public order. While it may be necessary to have a police force or an army, societal
viability is enhanced when those resources can be diverted into economic and
social development. So, to the degree that public order flows from a shared internal
commitment to organizational values or to the law and the legitimacy of legal
authorities, society is better off.
In addition to resource concerns, there are several social costs to a society that
relies on punishment to deter non-compliance. First, if people comply with the law
only in response to coercive power, they will be less likely to obey the law in the
future because acting in response to external pressures diminishes internal mo-
tivations to engage in socially desirable behavior.3 6 This follows from the well-
known distinction in social psychology between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
Research on intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation shows that when people are
motivated solely by the prospect of obtaining external rewards and punishments
(i.e., extrinsic motivation), they become less likely to perform the desired behavior
in the absence of these environmental reinforcements. On the other hand, if
people are motivated by intrinsic reasons for behaving in a certain way, then their
compliance becomes much more reliable and less context-dependent.
Second, the use of sanctions undermines value-based motivations because it
sends a message to the potential targets of the sanctions that the authorities view
them as untrustworthy and suspect. 39 As a result, people become more suspicious
and less trusting of the law and legal authorities. 4 0 This is a particular issue with
the internal cultures of organizations. If a company communicates an atmosphere
of surveillance and sanctioning, it is communicating mistrust, which undermines
employees' identification with the company and willingness to engage in self-
regulation.4 1 Of course, this argument should not be extended too far. Companies
need to make clear that they do not advocate or condone wrongdoing, and that they
will punish it. This can be communicated within the framework of a positive
message about the type of people that the company believes that its employees are,
and the type of behavior that it therefore expects from them.
In turn, authorities, whether within a company or in government, never develop
any basis for trusting the people over whom they exercise authority. The act of
monitoring in and of itself prevents authorities from having confidence that people
have internal values that would lead them to follow rules when not being watched.
36. See TYLER & BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS, supra note 27, at 65-68.
37. See Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic Definitions and
New Directions, 25 CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 54, 60-65 (2000).
38. BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY 13-33 (1997).
39. See TYLER & BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS, supra note 27, at 43-44.
40. See id.
41. Id.; see Tyler & Blader, Can Businesses Effectively Regulate Employee Conduct?, supra note 27, at 1154.
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Hence, a surveillance strategy sows the seeds of long-term surveillance because it
does not provide a way to create the basis for trust. The way to determine if a
person can be trusted to self-regulate is to allow him or her to act in unmonitored
situations and see what pattern the behavior reveals.
Of course, this cannot mean that companies should not monitor their em-
ployees, since if there were no monitoring it would never be possible to identify
and catch those who are taking advantage of the system. But there are different
levels of obtrusiveness and surveillance. Companies benefit from deemphasizing
surveillance and motivating desirable behavior by emphasizing trust and confi-
dence in the values of their employees whenever possible. To draw an example
from policing, it is difficult to imagine a world in which the police would never
need to use force. But that is different from a policing strategy in which every
interaction the police have with people on the street is one in which people are
intimidated and threatened by police officers. Such a strategy would highlight the
ability of the police to deploy force to compel compliance.
Third, legitimacy is valuable insofar as it has the ability to transform the
relationship between people and authorities. When I wrote Why People Obey the
Law in the 1980s, the ideal of a good citizen was very reactive:4 2 a good citizen
complied with the law. Today we have a much more active role in mind for
citizens. We want them not just to comply with the law, but to be motivated by
internal values to willingly obey the law. To the degree that people do this, the
cost of surveillance and punishment diminishes. The benefit of self-regulatory
models-that is, models that rely upon people to act on their values rather than
their fears of sanctions-is that such models are linked to the actions for which
people will take responsibility without fear of sanctions or promise of rewards.
The legal system benefits when people voluntarily defer to the decisions made
by judges and police officers and continue to defer over time. In the context of
personal experiences with regulatory authorities, the legal system is more effective
if people voluntarily accept the decisions made by regulatory authorities. Absent
such acceptance, legal authorities must engage in a continuing effort to create a
credible threat of punishment to assure long-term rule-following and decision
acceptance.
In terms of the influence of law on people's everyday lives, there is evidence
that, across a broad range of behaviors from paying income taxes to stopping at red
lights, people do not always follow the law. From traffic laws to drug laws, from
illegal immigration to non-payment of taxes, the problems involved in obtaining
compliance in everyday life are clear. In each case, while most people comply with
the law most of the time, legal authorities are confronted with sufficient non-
compliance to absorb the resources normally devoted to social control. Further, in
42. See Tom R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 3 (1990) ("[P]eople are viewed as shaping their behavior
to respond to changes in tangible, immediate incentives and penalties associated with following the law . . . .").
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situations such as the illegal downloading of music and the illegal copying of
movies, levels of noncompliance are so high that effective regulation is very dif-
ficult.4 3 The magnitude of these compliance problems should not be exaggerated,
but the attention of legal authorities has been increasingly directed to the need for a
better understanding of why people obey the law.
The acceptance of the decisions of legal authorities is similarly not effectively
motivated by the risk of punishment, because while threats can sometimes compel
obedience, they do not motivate voluntary deference. Absent such deference,
people only respond to the presence of force. A force-based strategy creates long-
term problems, because citizens who acquiesce in the presence of a legal authority
who could use sanctions can renege in their absence. If citizens fail to fully accept
legal restrictions as legitimate, further legal intervention will eventually be re-
quired. The legal system, therefore, must also be concerned with its ability to gain
long-term compliance, not just immediate compliance. Willing deference based
upon legitimacy leads to long-term acceptance, rather than short-term compliance.
Across the social sciences, there has been widespread recognition that it is
important to understand how to motivate cooperation on the part of people within
group settings. This is the case irrespective of whether those settings are small
groups, organizations, or communities." Studies in management show that work
organizations benefit when their members actively work for company success.4 5
Within law, research shows that crime and problems of community disorder are
difficult to solve without the active involvement of community residents.4 6
Political scientists recognize the importance of public involvement in building
both viable communities and strong societies.47 And those in public policy have
noted the value of cooperation in the process of policy-making-for example, in
stakeholder policy-making groups." With this backdrop, it is important to ask
whether the actions of legal authorities can aid in the production of social capital
that might more generally engage cooperation.
Recent discussions of legal authority focus on this broader conception of the
relationship between community residents and legal authorities, which suggests a
new and broader conception of citizenship. 49 Rather than a conception of citizen-
ship as simply accepting and deferring to legal authorities, citizenship is increas-
ingly seen as connected to willing and active cooperation with authorities in
43. See Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us About Persuading
People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 661-65 (2006).
44. See generally TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE, supra note 27.
45. See generally TYLER & BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS, supra note 27.
46. Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: The Benefits of Self-Regulation, 7 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. LAW
307, 330-31 (2009).
47. See, e.g., ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (2000).
48. Peter J. May, Regulation and Compliance Motivations: Examining Different Approaches, 65 PUBLIC
ADMIN. REv. 31, 32 (2005).
49. See, e.g., Tyler, supra note 46.
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creating and maintaining order in the community.50 Cooperation is essentially
voluntary if non-cooperation risks little or no sanction. In particular, not reporting
transgressions is something that is virtually undetectable.
People's willingness to report transgressions is therefore linked to a broader
loyalty or sense of duty to the community and its authorities. Such cooperative
behaviors are thus general civic activities akin to more traditionally studied
forms of political participation. In other words, the issue that is being raised
with respect to crime is the same type of issue raised with regard to any matter
affecting a community: how can citizens be motivated to become involved in
deciding how to manage their community, and engage in behaviors oriented
toward doing so?
Legitimacy forms the basis for a self-regulatory strategy. The self-regulatory
model argues that the values embodied in legitimacy have the potential to motivate
employees to feel a personal responsibility for bringing their behavior into line
with corporate rules and policies. It is based on the assumption that people are
motivated to align their behavior with the rules of organizations or groups they
belong to when they view those groups as being legitimate. The use of such a
self-regulatory model has long been advocated in discussions of legal regulation of
business, 5 I and has been advanced with particular frequency in recent years. 52 The
empirical issue is whether employees' ethical values can in reality-as hypoth-
esized by self-regulatory model-provide a viable basis for encouraging employee
policy adherence.
According to such a model, employees can be intrinsically motivated to follow
organizational rules: that is, they will do so out of their own desire, and not out
of the contingencies established by the organization for their behavior. The
self-regulatory model specifically depends upon the role of employees' values in
shaping intrinsic motivation to follow rules. The success of this approach depends
upon the power of employees' values to motivate their rule- and policy-following
behavior in the workplace. Such a model depends first, upon the ability of or-
ganizations to create internal cultures that emphasize legitimacy; and second, upon
50. See id.
51. See PHILIP SELZNICK wrrH PHILIPPE NONET & HOWARD M. VOLLMER, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE
101-02 (1969).
52. See, e.g., Marius Aalders & Ton Wilthagen, Moving Beyond Command-and-Control: Reflexivity in the
Regulation of Occupational Safety and Health and the Environment, 19 LAW& PoL'Y 415 (1997); John M. Darley
et al., Enacting Justice: The Interplay of Individual and Institutional Perspectives, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF
SocIAL PSYCHOLOGY 458 (Michael Hogg & Joel Cooper eds., 2003); Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry
Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective, 19 LAw & POL'Y 363 (1997); Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox,
Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 698 (2000); Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of En-
vironmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 1181 (1998); Suchman, supra note 8; Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law
Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361 (2001); Tom R. Tyler & John M.
Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal
Authorities Into Account When Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707 (2000).
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the legitimacy of external law and legal authority. Ideally, internal legitimacy has
sufficient effect that the question of external legitimacy never arises.
Research suggests that certain values, such as legitimacy, can motivate self-
regulatory behavior in organizational settings. This includes studies focused on
legitimacy,5 3 morality, 54 and the general role of fairness in shaping social behavior.55
Tyler and Blader provide one example of research on this topic.5 We report two
studies (one of a sample of corporate bankers, and another of a large and diverse
sample of American employees) focusing on the internal legitimacy of organiza-
tional rules.57 Analysis of both samples indicates that employee rule-following
and policy-adherence was strongly influenced by legitimacy.58 Interestingly,
when the broad sample is divided into categories reflecting the dimensions sep-
arating white-collar and blue-collar employees, similar findings emerge in both
groups. 9 The link between legitimacy and compliance, therefore, applies to
workers generally.
In addition to examining the factors shaping everyday behavior the literature
also suggests that the legitimacy of law and of legal authorities also shapes def-
erence to the law and the willingness to accept the decisions of legal authorities
when people have a personal experience such as going to court or dealing with a
police officer on the street or when they are driving.60
B. The Difficulty of Maintaining Social Order Based on Legitimacy
Legitimacy is thus a highly desirable feature of social systems with many
appealing features as a possible basis for the rule of law.6 1 Why, then, is it so
difficult to create and maintain a legal system based upon legitimacy, and why do
legal authorities use instrumental approaches based upon utilitarian models? 62
53. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 42; TYLER & BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS, supra note 27; Human &
Provan, supra note 7; Hurd, supra note 7; Suchman, supra note 8; Tyler, supra note 9; Tom R. Tyler et al., Armed,
and Dangerous (?): Motivating Rule Adherence Among Agents of Social Control, 41 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 457
(2007); Monica A. Zimmerman & Gerald J. Zeitz, Beyond Survival: Achieving New Venture Growth by Building
Legitimacy, 27 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 414 (2002).
54. See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a
Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 549 (1996); Tyler & Blader, Can Businesses
Effectively Regulate Employee Conduct?, supra note 27.
55. See, e.g., Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. EcoN. REV.
1281 (1993); Tyler & Blader, Can Businesses Effectively Regulate Employee Conduct?, supra note 27; Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance,
22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 103-106 (2003).
56. See Tyler & Blader, Can Businesses Effectively Regulate Employee Conduct?, supra note 27.
57. Id. at 1146, 1149.
58. Id. at 1553.
59. Id.
60. ToM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAw: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE
AND COURrs 101 (2002).
61. See id. at 101; TYLER, supra note 42, at 19-27; Tyler, supra note 9, at 393-94.
62. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE, supra note 27, at 147-48.
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Why is the immediate response of legal authorities to a crisis, whether it is an issue
of terrorism or financial misconduct, to focus on threats and sanctioning?
One reason could be that legal authorities overestimate the effectiveness of the
utilitarian approach to the implementation of laws and regulations. They could
believe, for example, that threat deters immediate behavior and that punishment
lowers recidivism. 63 If research does not support this argument, as is suggested by
the literature reviewed above," then why would it represent the conventional
wisdom within law?
At least some of this conventional wisdom is likely based on behavior that legal
authorities see occurring in front of their very eyes every day. People faced with
authorities may comply in the moment, when the threat of those authorities is
palpable (although evidence suggests that they often resist). Then, later (and,
more importantly, outside the scope of plausible surveillance), when their be-
havior is not motivated by the immediate threat of punishment, they renege. As a
consequence, those in positions of authority have the continual experience of
seeing power work to influence behavior, when in fact that influence is extremely
short-lived. People in power therefore come to think that the threat and use of
force is a more viable and effective strategy than it actually is. This is the "myth
of self-interest." Studies show that people expect others to be more strongly
influenced by self-interested judgments, for example about potential rewards and
punishments than they actually are.6 This is especially true of people in positions
of authority.66
In reality, as I have detailed above, reviews of the literature consistently show
that the threat and use of force is generally ineffective.67 Variations in the
likelihood of being caught and punished have a minor impact on criminal behavior
at best. Whether people are punished is not reliably related to lower levels of future
criminal conduct and more severe punishment is not linked to less criminality in
the future.6 8 When this widespread lack of empirical support for force-based
approaches is compared to the general belief in the effectiveness of such models,
the question is why this widely held, but mistaken, belief persists?
To some extent this continuation in a flawed belief reflects the self-fulfilling
nature of theories and models. Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton discuss the dominant
role of economic models in organizational theory and the similar lack of strong
empirical support for such models in that context.6 9 They argue that whether or not
63. See Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1193, 1195 (1985).
64. See supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
65. Dale T. Miller & Rebecca K. Ratner, The Disparity Between the Actual and Assumed Power of
Self-Interest, 74 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 53, 54-55 (1998).
66. See id. at 59-61.
67. See supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
68. See HARCOURT, supra note 21, at 109-10.
69. Fabrizio Ferraro et al., Economics Language and Assumptions: How Theories Can Become Self-Fulfilling,
30 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 8,9-10 (2005).
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a theory appears self-evident is more strongly related to whether it is consistent
with cultural myths than whether it is supported by empirical evidence. 70 This
leads to the question of why people find it so compelling to think of people as
utilitarian. Does utilitarianism in some way comport with our understanding of
everyday experience? At least in the case of authorities, I argue that it does because
power produces compliance in the everyday personal experience of legal authori-
ties.
Once people have such a conception of their own and other's motivational
nature, it is difficult to let go of those beliefs even when the evidence for them is
discredited. As Baron notes: "We tend to hold to our beliefs without sufficient
regard to the evidence against them or the lack of evidence in their favor."7 '
Psychologists refer to this as "belief perseverance."7 2
Instead of openly considering evidence questioning their beliefs, research
suggests that people engage in psychological strategies to blunt the impact of
discordant information upon their beliefs. One approach that people use is to
look primarily or exclusively for confirming information that allows them to
maintain their beliefs. For example, people shape the way they frame their study of
problems in ways that support their prior views. There is a general tendency, for
example, to frame deterrence studies as questions of whether deterrence works, in
the sense that its effects can be shown to be significantly different from zero.74
Against this relatively low standard deterrence effects are often found and
researchers can conclude that deterrence is effective.
An alternative approach is to ask how much of the variance in a behavior a
model explains. As an example, MacCoun reviewed the literature on deterrence
in the case of drug use and suggested that only about 5% of the variance in drug
use was explained by variations in the certainty and severity of punishment.
Compare the message of Ziliak and McCloskey with that of MacCoun. The former
suggests it is not enough to say deterrence has a statistically significant influence
on behavior, while the latter suggests, consistent with the Ziliak and McCloskey
argument that even when there are statistically significant effects, deterrence
70. Id at 20-21.
71. JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 195 (2000).
72. Craig A. Anderson et al., Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of Explanation in the Persistence
of Discredited Information, 39 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1037, 1038 (1980); cf Lee Ross et al.,
Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception: Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefing
Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 880, 889 (1975) (discussing "impression perseverance").
73. Anderson et al., supra note 72, at 1038.
74. See STEPHEN T. ZILIAK & DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE CULT OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 33-41 (2008)
(explaining the general limitations of quantitative studies' reliance on statistical significance alone).
75. Cf id. (explaining the "sizeless stare of statistical significance," where significance does not indicate the
magnitude of the detected effect).
76. Robert J. MacCoun, Drugs and the Law: A Psychological Analysis of Drug Prohibition, 113 PsycHoL.
BULL. 497, 501 (1993).
77. See ZILIAK & MCCLOSKEY, supra note 74, at 33-41.
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explains at best a very small proportion of the variance in law related behavior. In
other words, a relationship between two variables can be found to be statistically
significant but can nonetheless explain so little of the variance between them that it
is of little consequence.
This line of argument can be extended to studies that compare deterrence
effects to the influence of other factors. Tyler and Blader did this in two studies
of employees and showed that risk was relatively unimportant in shaping com-
pliance relative to the legitimacy of the companies' internal culture.79 I examined
this same question in a larger survey of 4,430 employees and found that instru-
mental factors explained 1% of the variance in required compliance while social
factors, including legitimacy, explained 19% of the variance.8 0 As noted above, the
influence of instrumental factors was statistically significant, but not as strong as
the influence of social factors.
Similarly, Trevino, Weaver, Gibson, and Toffler compared the effectiveness
of rules and punishment to the internal values and culture of integrity in companies
in a study of 10,000 employees in six industries.8 ' Compared to compliance-based
programs, values-based programs had fewer reports of unethical conduct, higher
levels of ethical awareness, more employees seeking advice about ethical issues,
and a higher likelihood of employees reporting violations. 82 Here again, a relative
comparison reveals the superiority of a values-based approach.
The perceived dominance of deterrence is further aided by the tendency to
collect data based upon the framework of existing theory. In America, national
surveys collect information on crime rates, arrest rates, and sentencing. These can
be linked to statistics on the certainty and severity of punishment, as well as the
length of sentences. However, it is not possible to compare influences to those of
legitimacy in most cases because legitimacy is not assessed; there are no national
survey research studies dedicated to the periodic measurement of the legitimacy of
law, the courts, or the police or administrative regulatory agencies.
III. THE MYSTIQUE OF UTirITARIANISM
A. The psychological attraction of instrumental models
The motivation to govern instrumentally is not only the result of an unwill-
ingness to let go of an unsupported theory. Adopting utilitarian models is also
psychologically attractive to the people in authority. Such models support illusions
78. See MacCoun, supra note 76, at 501. .
79. Tyler & Blader, Can Businesses Effectively Regulate Employee Conduct, supra note 27, at 1553.
80. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE, supra note 27, at 57.
81. Linda Klebe Treviiio et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts, 41 CAL.
MGMT. REv. 131, 132 (1999).
82. Id. at 138.
83. See Tom R. TYLER, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE DESIGN OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 9-19 (2007).
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of competence, good character, and security, all of which provide important
psychological benefits to authorities.
Psychological studies suggest that people generally exaggerate their own com-
petence and ability both relative to task difficulty and to the competence of
others.8 4 Such illusions are psychologically satisfying and are associated with
high levels of self-esteem. As Kahneman suggests, "[m]ost of us view ... our
own attributes as more favorable than they truly are, and the goals we adopt as
more achievable than they are likely to be,"" and "[pisychologists have confirmed
that most people genuinely believe that they are superior to most others on most
desirable traits."8 Having power accentuates this tendency and leads to perceived
control over outcomes "beyond the reach" of a power holder.8
Given their high levels of perceived self-competence, leaders naturally want
to control decisions, and to facilitate that goal, concentrating resources in their
hands makes sense. If someone is more competent than others, there are plausible
justifications for them to be the person who decides what will happen. Utilitarian
models maximize the perception of both leaders and followers that leaders are in
control. Leaders create this impression when they engage in top-down manage-
ment through a model in which they direct the incentives and sanctions. There
never seems to be a shortage of authorities with confidence in their unique skills
and insights into problems.
An interesting example of this phenomenon is found in research on the accuracy
of professional judgments. Researchers often find that professional legal authori-
ties, such as police officers, have higher confidence in their judgmental abilities
than do laypeople.89 These authorities believe that their experience gives them the
capacity to make better decisions, even though research frequently fails to support
this belief. For example, experts are not generally found to be better at detecting
deception or making eyewitness identifications than are lay people.90 Similarly,
studies of decision making by jurors typically use decisions made by judges as a
reference standard for the right answer, inferring that departures from what a judge
would decide reflect the lesser ability of lay decision makers.91 Studies, however,
also suggest that judges are subject to the same types of heuristics and biases found
84. Mark D. Alicke & Olesya Govorun, The Better-Than-Average Effect, in THE SELF IN SOCIAL JUDGMENT 85,
102-04 (Mark D. Alicke et al. eds., 2005); Mark R. Leary, Motivational and Emotional Aspects of the Self,
58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 317, 321 (2007).
85. Shelly E. Taylor & Jonathan D. Brown, Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on
Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOL. BuLL.193, 199 (1988).
86. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FASTAND SLOW 255 (2011).
87. Id. at 258.
88. Nathanael J. Fast et al., Illusory Control: A Generative Force Behind Power's Far-Reaching Effects,
20 PSYCHOL. Sci. 502, 502 (2009).
89. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases,
2006 Wis. L. REv. 291, 337-38.
90. See Gary D. Bond, Deception Detection Expertise, 32 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 339, 347-48 (2008).
91. See generally HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANs ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
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in the decisions made by lay people,92 and are not necessarily more likely to ignore
inadmissible evidence or deal with many of the limits in the ability to manage
information or apply the law which are often noted in critiques of the abilities of
jurors.9
An extension of this argument is that a decisive leader is better able to govern
than a group. This, in turn, leads to support for the idea that: "What this country
needs most, more than laws and political programs, is a few courageous, tireless,
devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith."94 Conversely, studies
show that it is deliberative and participatory processes that are central to the rule of
law and the creation of legitimacy,9"5 so that concentration of power in an
individual who makes policy decisions and implements them instrumentally is
less likely to produce popular legitimacy.9 6 This utilitarian approach to social order
may have advantages at least in the short term, which will be discussed below,
but there has been and continues to be a "romance of leadership" whereby leaders'
ability to shape outcomes is exaggerated both by followers and by leaders
themselves. While such an exaggerated belief in competence may be beneficial
to leaders' necessary self-confidence, it undermines legitimacy insofar as it leads
leaders to be dismissive of others and unwilling to work collaboratively.
Exaggerated confidence leads people to take on tasks that are more complex or
risky than they can actually manage.9 8 As a result, leaders step confidently into
situations they cannot handle well. The management literature shows that once
people embark upon a course of action they cannot handle, they tend not to
question their competence when their strategy begins to unravel but rather to
throw more and more resources into that course of action." Instead of reexamining
his or her sense of competence, the optimistic leader takes credit for success, but
not failure. This is effective when the goal is persistence, but harmful when that
persistence leads to a failure to recognize a failing strategy.
92. Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking On The Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 43 (2007);
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries By Comparison To Judges: A Benchmark For Judging?, 32 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 469, 509 (2005).
93. NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES 168 (2007); Robbennolt, supra note 92, at 492-93.
94. T.W. ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 248 (1950).
95. Marcia Grimes, Organizing Consent: The Role of Procedural Fairness in Political Trust and Compliance,
45 EUR. J. POL. RES. 285, 306-08 (2006).
96. See id.
97. James R. Meindl et al., The Romance Of Leadership, 30 ADMIN. Sa. Q. 78, 78-79, 100 (1985).
98. E.g., Thomas Astebro, The Return to Independent Invention: Evidence Of Unrealistic Optimism, Risk
Seeking Or Skewness Loving?, 113 ECON. J. 226, 236-38 (2003); Eta S. Berner & Mark L. Graber, Overconfi-
dence as a Cause of Diagnostic Error in Medicine, 121 AM. J. MED. S2, S6-S8 (2008); Ulrike Malmendier &
Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction, 89 J. FIN. EcON. 20,21
(2008); Paul D. Windschitl et al., Are People Excessive or Judicious In Their Egocentrism?: A Modeling
Approach to Understanding Bias and Accuracy in People's Optimism, 95 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 253,
267-70 (2008).
99. See JOEL BROCKNER & JEFFREY Z. RuBIN, ENTRAPMENT IN ESCALATING CONFLIcrS 231-32 (1985).
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A second illusion is the illusion of good character. People view others as less
motivated to act upon values, or to behave in a just and moral way, than they are in
fact.xoo As a consequence, they view themselves as appropriate decision-makers
because their decisions are more likely to be linked to what is right and proper,
rather than to their own self-interest. Also, because other people are viewed as
acting based upon self-interest, appeals to their values are likely to be ineffective,
leaving utilitarianism as the only viable basis for influencing others' behavior.'0o
Consider, for example, negotiations. Negotiations require people to make
inferences about other people's actions and what those actions indicate about
their character. Researchers have found that the Chinese are less likely to make
dispositional attributions about others than are Americans.10 2 Why? In general, in
interactions with others the Chinese are less likely to view others as acting out of
poor motives, such as self-interest or a desire to win, and instead view the other
parties' actions as flowing from situational forces. Because they make situational
attributions, viewing behavior as caused by forces within the situation rather than
the character of the actors, they are less likely to interpret the actions of others as
reflecting untrustworthy or self-interested character, and they are more able to
successfully engage in cooperative interactions. They are less likely to refuse to
deal with the other party because they think they are being dishonest, untrust-
worthy or immoral.
10 3
Finally, because authorities have control over resources and power they feel se-
cure and protected. There is psychological reassurance in a perception of posses-
sion of superior force capabilities when entering an uncertain situation. As an
example, the police seek to project force and dominate situations using their
possession of a variety of types of weapons: guns, clubs, Tasers, mace, etc.
Ironically, while being psychologically reassuring, this approach creates a problem
for the police because it leads to anger and resistance in those who they are
attempting to control. Relationships are defined by the police in terms of domi-
nance and subordination through the use of power, and the people they are dealing
with then respond within a framework of resistance and defiance.'04
100. David M. Messick et al., Why We Are Fairer Than Others, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 480,
497-99 (1985).
101. Tom Tyler & Lindsay Rankin, The Mystique of Instrumentalism, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW
537, 560 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012).
102. Michael W. Morris & Michele J. Gelfand, Cultural Differences and Cognitive Dynamics: Expanding the
Cognitive Perspective on Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE 45, 61-62 (Michele J.
Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett eds., 2004).
103. See Michael W. Morris & Kaiping Peng, Culture and Cause: American and Chinese Attributions for
Social and Physical Events, 67 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHoL. 949, 968 (1994) (finding that the Chinese are
more likely to make situational attributions than Americans are).
104. See JOHN D. MCCLUSKEY, POLICE REQUESTS FOR COMPLIANCE 76 (2003); cf Harold H. Kelley &
Anthony J. Stahelski, Social Interaction Basis of Cooperators'and Competitors'Beliefs About Others, 16 J. PER-
SONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 66, 87-89 (1970) (examining in a game theory setting how people tend to behave
based on beliefs about the other actor's motives).
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Is there evidence addressing this concern in the context of immediate resis-
tance? Using the area of policing, where resistance is an everyday occurrence and
security a serious issue, McCluskey uses evidence collected in observer-based
studies of police-citizen encounters in Indiana and Florida to explore the role of
police coercion in motivating citizen compliance.' 05 According to a force-based
model, the police should be able to increase citizen compliance by projecting
authority. McCluskey tests this argument using observer ratings of police behav-
ior.10 6 Focusing on police requests for citizen self-control, McCluskey found that
for initial requests by the police for compliance "[s]urprisingly, the coercive power
that police bring to bear on a citizen in the form of commanding, handcuffing,
arresting and so on, has a minimal impact on citizen's compliance decision." 07
Similarly, at later points in the interaction, McCluskey found that "the higher the
level of coercive action displayed by police, the less likely targets are to comply,"
and"[flor every one unit increase [in] the index of coercion[,] citizens are about
twice as likely to rebel against the self-control request." 0 This lead him to
conclude that "[t]hough coercion may be a central component of the police role, it
appears to serve little to enhance compliance when first asked or when requests are
repeated by the police."' 09
McCluskey did note that when the police mention the possibility of arrest,
compliance goes up." 0 However, he views this effect as due not to coercion, but to
the greater legitimacy that the police have when their actions are seen as consistent
with the law."' As a consequence, police scholars generally argue that "[t]he best
officers are those who use less, not more force."ll 2 This issue is related to police
safety because it is efforts to coerce compliance that often lead to defiance and
hostility, escalating conflict and injuries to both civilians and officers.
Because of these illusions of competence and character, authorities have lower
levels of stress." 3 They are also motivated to govern instrumentally, acting
proactively to control others"l4 and treating other people as objects whose value is
defined by their utility in achieving instrumental goals."' First, since they are the
105. MCCLUSKEY, supra note 104, at 76.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 100.
108. Id. at 108.
109. Id. at 173.
110. Id. at 156.
Ill. See id. at 173.
112. See WILLIAM TERRILL, POLICE COERCION 232 (2001); see also Kimberly Belvedere et al., Explaining
Suspect Resistance in Police-Citizen Encounters, 30 CRIM. JUST. REV. 30, 33-35 (2005) (summarizing theories of
police resistance).
113. Gary D. Sherman et al., Leadership is Associated with Lower Levels ofStress, 109 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
Sci. 17,903, 17,905-06 (2012).
114. See Dacher Keltner et al., Power Approach, and Inhibition, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 265, 275 (2003).
115. See Deborah H. Gruenfeld et al., Power and the Objectlfication of Social Targets, 95 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 11l, 123-25 (2008).
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most competent, authorities believe that they should control resources. Because
they are the most moral, they believe that it is appropriate for them to make
decisions for others. Finally, since they are in possession of power, they believe
they are secure. There are, therefore, a variety of reasons that authorities fall easily
into a utilitarian approach, managing social order by the threat or use of force and
deploying community resources to address the problems and concerns that they
feel are of importance.
B. The Benefits of Utilitarianism
The benefit of utilitarianism is that it allows quick changes in the deployment of
resources.116 It is easier to change the allocation of instrumental resources than it is
to create values such as legitimacy. Creating values is always a long-term project.
Hence, instrumental approaches are most likely to be adopted when people do not
plan ahead and are managing reactively once problems develop: when people are
responding to emergencies, such as terrorism or a crime wave, and when people
are operating within a short-term framework. For example, police departments
respond to homicides by "hot spot" policing strategies in which they flood an area
with police officers."' Crime goes down, but departments can seldom maintain the
high levels of patrol needed to maintain this effect, so eventually the officers are
transferred out as the threat diminishes causing crime rates to again increase." 8
Similarly, the question of how much attention the federal government can pay
to monitoring private businesses is central to deterrence models, as is the question
of how much salience private companies will give to creating and maintaining
an ethical work culture. When businesses need to achieve short-term quarterly
profits or political leaders must produce rapid gains prior to an election, instru-
mental approaches are attractive. The problem with utilitarianism, however, is
that over time it undermines the relationship between authorities and populations
and is therefore difficult to sustain in the long run. Utilitarian control is personally
satisfying to authorities and may yield short-term successes, but it fails in the
long-term.
What are the problems created by an instrumental approach? The first problem
is that this approach creates an undifferentiated social reality. The key to effective
interactions is to distinguish among people by identifying those who can respond
to behavior based upon their values and those who must be dealt with instrumen-
tally by making threats or promises.' However, when people are approached
116. See Joe C. Magee & Adam D. Galinsky, Social Hierarchy: The Self-Reinforcing Nature of Power and
Status, 2 AcAD. MGMT. ANNALS 351, 356-58 (2008).
117. David Weisburd & Anthony A. Braga, Hot Spots Policing as a Model for Police Innovation, in POLICE
INNOVATION 225, 229-30 (David Weisburd & Anthony A. Braga eds., 2006).
118. Dennis P. Rosenbaum, The Limits of Hot Spots Policing, in POLICE INNOVATION, supra note 117, at 256.
119. See Kelley & Stahelski, supra note 104, at 74-76 (examining misconceptions of others' motivations
during game theory interactions).
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from an instrumental perspective with threats or promises they respond instrumen-
tally by reacting in terms of costs and benefits. As a result authorities create a
situation in which they deal with everyone instrumentally, irrespective of whether
those people could potentially respond to them based upon values if their values
were appealed to. The authorities, in other words, do. not motivate anyone to obey
the law because of their view that legal authorities are legitimate and ought to be
obeyed, since they threaten all the members of the community with fines, arrest, or
imprisonment for noncompliance. This is an inefficient strategy for creating co-
operation and sub-optimal for the authorities trying to garner that cooperation. 12 0
The pyramid of regulation is one example of the application of this approach.12 1
Ayres and Braithwaite argue that everyone should initially be approached through
appeals to values. 12 2 Most will respond. The few who do not can then be treated as
subject to punishment. In this manner, resources can be directed toward the small
group that needs surveillance and sanctioning while the majority, who respond to
values, is addressed in terms of appeals to values.12 3
In addition, surveillance is problematic because it is a self-perpetuating strategy.
When managers adopt a strategy of closely monitoring employee performance
they create no basis for trusting employees to work when they are not being
monitored. 1 24 As a consequence, managers need to continue to monitor those
employees. Similarly, if the police encourage law-abidingness through the threat
of punishment, they can never be sure whether people would obey the law if they
were not watching. Hence, they need to continue to create a credible threat of
punishment in the future.
Finally, and ironically, in the long term continued surveillance turns out to be
needed because a focus on instrumental factors "crowds out" the role of other mo-
tivations in shaping rule-related behavior.12 5 Even if people are initially motivated
to comply with the law both because of concerns about being caught and punished,
as well as for value-based reasons such as legitimacy, morality, and peer opinion,
authorities' focus on deterrence defines the relationship between people and the
law as one of risk, and it becomes instrumental. Over time this leads to a decline in
the influence of value-based reasons. Eventually people primarily decide whether
to comply or to fail to comply based upon their levels of fear of punishment. And,
as previously noted, often this calculation leads to rule-breaking behavior.
120. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLuTION OF COOPERATION 124-41 (1984) (discussing optimal strategies for
encouraging cooperation).
121. See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION (1992).
122. See id at 3-7.
123. Id.
124. Arie W. Kruglanski, Attributing Trustworthiness in Supervisor-Worker Relations, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL
Soc. PSYCHOL. 214, 227-31 (1970); Lloyd H. Strickland, Surveillance and Trust, 26 J. PERSONALrfY 200, 212-15
(1958).
125. See Bruno S. Frey, How Intrinsic Motivation Is Crowded Out and In, 6 RATIONALITY & Soc'Y 334, 334
(1994).
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As an example, consider the well-known study "A Fine is a Price" by Gneezy
and Rustichini.12 6 A school had problems with parents picking their children up
on time. They first appealed to the parents' norm of responsibility and later
introduced a fine. Parents treated the fine as the price of being late and their sense
of responsibility to be on time became less central to picking up their children.12 7
In other words, introducing a fine turned what was a value-based obligation into an
economic transaction. If parents paid the fine, they did not feel they had failed a
social obligation by being late.12 8
Despite short-term attractions, a utilitarian strategy undermines itself in the
long term. Because of the general ineffectiveness of social control, utilitarian
strategies underperform relative to expectations. In particular, these approaches
end up costing more than anticipated, so the availability of resources limits the
degree to which they can be implemented. The massive growth in prison costs is an
example. 129 This growth in costs flows from the use of a deterrence approach
combined with the resultant pressure for longer sentences.130 During a period of
economic downturn these costs have proved unsustainable.131
Such failures cast doubts upon the competence of leaders. However, having
framed issues instrumentally it is difficult for authorities to go back and appeal
to values. Trying to change strategy presents both psychological and political
problems. First, it requires acknowledging failure, and threatens illusions of
competence. Second, the position of leader requires success and acknowledging
failure is often not an option. As a result, authorities often perceive little choice but
to push for more severe punishments, even though research makes clear that it is
certainty of punishment, not severity that matters.13 2 Similarly, there is ongoing
pressure to devote greater resources to surveillance. The police and courts have no
mechanism but threat, and no recourse but massive incarceration. And society is
stuck with a costly and minimally functional system of law and law enforcement.
An example of recent importance in the United States will be illustrative: co-
ercion and torture. The recent salience of terrorism and torture has brought to the
fore a long-running debate in social psychology about the effectiveness of force in
eliciting information from those motivated to conceal it. A review of that literature
is beyond the scope of this paper,13 3 as the concern for purposes of this paper is not
126. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000).
127. Id. at 15-16.
128. Id.
129. See VANESSA BARKER, THE POLYTICS OF IMPRISONMENT 4 (2009).
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. See generally ALFRED BLUMSTEIN ET AL., DETERRENCE AND INCAPACTIATION (1978).
133. See Steven M. Kleinman, Barriers to Success: Critical Challenges in Developing a New Educing
Information Paradigm, in EDUCING INFORMATION 235, 264-65 (Nat'1 Def. Intelligence Coll. ed., 2006) (providing
historical analysis). See generally JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE (2008) (providing a review of recent debates on
the use of torture in the context of terrorism).
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with the use of coercion as a social control strategy (i.e., torturing some people to
frighten and thereby deter others), but rather, with the fairly widespread belief
that physical force is an effective mechanism for gaining information from
reluctant people. That issue parallels our prior discussion concerning physical
force and conforming behavior, with an important difference: physical force can
sometimes be effective in gaining immediate compliance when an authority is
present and is viewed as able to deploy immediate sanctions. Nonetheless, while
torture may appear to lead to the desired confessions of secret information, it is
unclear whether such confessions are actually reliable, and thus unclear if torture
achieves its stated short-term goal. 1 34
However, consistent with the evidence summarized above, the data suggest the
instrumentalism that underlies torture does not work.13 5 One core problem with
the use of coercion to elicit information is that interrogators are unable to detect
when someone is lying.13 6 While a wide variety of mechanical techniques for de-
tecting lying exist, a review of such physiological or neurological methods, rang-
ing from lie detectors to brain scans, indicates that "none of these mechanical
devices has been scientifically shown to be capable of accurately and reliably de-
tecting deception."1 3 7 For interrogations to be effective, those being interrogated
thus need to be motivated to tell the truth, not simply forced to divulge information
in response to physical coercion, since the veracity of such coerced statements is
dubious.
A review of interrogation research suggests that techniques involving "hostility
and the employment of force[,] be it physical or psychological[," are counter-
productive.13 8 So when does interrogation work? Kleinman argues that successful
interrogations are typically linked to the development of a human connection
between the interrogator and the person being interrogated.' 3 9 In other words, the
two players must build a social bond. Kleinman, therefore, suggests that inter-
rogators focus on creating a cooperative relationship with their subjects, based
on sensitivity to the person's needs and concerns. Toward that goal, "coercive
approaches are rightfully rejected." 14 0
While discussions of interrogations of terrorists do not focus on engaging
legitimacy or moral values, studies of criminal confessions show that the most
134. Steven M. Kleinman, KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Review: Observations ofan Interroga-
tor, in EDUCING INFORMATION, supra note 133, at 95, 130 (acknowledging that "the scientific community has never
established that coercive interrogation methods are an effective means of obtaining reliable intelligence
information").
135. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
136. ALDERT VRu, DETECTING LIEs AND DECEIT 67-69 (2000); Gary Hazlett, Research on Detection of
Deception, in EDUCING INFORMATION, supra note 133, at 45.
137. Kristin E. Heckman & Mark D. Happel, Mechanical Detection of Deception: A Short Review, in EDUCING
INFORMATION, supra note 133, at 63, 83.
138. Kleinman, supra note 134, at 95.
139. Id. at 123.
140. Id.
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effective interrogation technique for eliciting confessions is to appeal to the
suspect's conscience: that is, his or her moral values.141 Strategies designed to
build rapport and encourage suspects to voluntarily confess information include
"treat[ing] the suspect with decency and respect," "not handcuff[ing] or shack-
l[ing] the suspect," and "recogniz[ing] that in everyone there is some good,
however slight it might be."' 4 2 A recurring theme in the interrogation literature is
that people are more likely to involve themselves in a positive relationship and to
engage their values and voluntarily cooperate when they anticipate respect and
decent treatment from their captors. Interrogation is thus similar to policing in
general: the most effective method for achieving the desired behavior is ensuring
that the individual is voluntarily motivated to comply. In short, just as the police
need willing cooperation, so do interrogators.
As we have noted, the basic approach of coercion does not elicit the desired
truthful information from reluctant and hostile prisoners. However, once authori-
ties have embarked upon this course of interrogation, they typically are pushed to
even greater levels of extreme violence and coercion by the very failure of this
approach to elicit information. Mayer documents discussions in recent years about
how to respond to the failure of violent interrogation techniques.14 3 She notes that
there is a constant pressure to achieve results by escalating to more extreme
methods of coercion when milder forms have proved ineffective, as interrogators
typically do.
With both deterrence and coercion, the core problem is similar: by embarking
on a force-based strategy, authorities undermine their rapport with the people
involved, who come to mistrust and even hate the authorities, to develop opposi-
tional consciousness, and to resist and undermine those authorities. Any hope for
cooperation or collaboration is undermined by feelings of distrust and anger and by
motives of concealment and misdirection. Further, once the ineffectiveness of a
force-based strategy becomes apparent, going back is difficult. Any later efforts to
appeal to people's values or build rapport are tainted and unlikely to be successful,
even when they would have been the superior strategy if pursued from the
outset.'" Lacking alternative courses of action and late in the game, the authorities
implement the only strategy they see as possible: an even more severe force-based
approach. As a result, the opportunity for a value-based strategy is diminished and
eventually destroyed.
Mass incarceration is a further example. To make deterrence work there needs to
141. Ariel Neuman & Daniel Salinas-Serrano, Custodial Interrogations, What We Know, What We Do, and
What We Can Learn from Law Enforcement Experiences, in EDUCING INFORMATION, supra note 133, at 141, 172
(drawing on evidence from Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266
(1996)).
142. Id. at 186.
143. MAYER, supra note 133, at 134-36, 144, 164-74.
144. See, e.g., Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 126, at 8 (noting that removal of a fine as punishment did not
return individuals to their pre-fine, value-based behavior).
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be punishment. Because incarceration increases the risk of recidivism, 14 5 the
punitive system is creating a group of long-term criminals with resulting repeat
incarcerations. Moreover, there is political pressure for even more severe punish-
ments, based upon the failure of less severe punishments to work.
Authorities are constantly found in a situation of declining effectiveness, but
it is hard to convert a utilitarian strategy to a legitimacy strategy. Further, because
value reliance has been "crowded out," lifting surveillance often results in prob-
lems caused by non-compliance.14 6 The end of an autocratic regime is often
associated with increases in crime, even if the new regime is democratic.
Populations used to obeying out of fear do not associate law abidingness with
values, and suddenly find the risk of punishment to be lower. For example, crime
rates have increased in South Africa during its democratic transition.147
And, of course a final coercive strategy is currently being used to combat
corruption in for-profit organizations. In 2002, Sarbanes-Oxley was passed in re-
sponse to the large corporate frauds of Enron, WorldCom, and others. 148 Sarbanes-
Oxley encourages organizations to take a more command and control approach
to compliance. Similarly, the government's response to wrongdoing has empha-
sized the responsibility to identify and sanction wrongdoing. What is central to
both is not that deterrence might be needed but that the general approach taken
is framed in terms of creating credible threats of sanctioning and emphasizing
mechanisms for surveillance and punishment. The centrality of sanctioning to
government approaches to stopping corporate wrongdoing should not be over-
stated, as the.Federal Sentencing Guidelines also emphasize creating an ethical
culture.14 9
This discussion makes clear the importance of examining the limits of force-
based approaches in advance of policy formation and implementation. The time to
capitalize on people's commitment to values and their prior belief that authorities
are legitimate and their values moral is prior to any use of force. Time is needed to
create or strengthen values and to engage existing values through participatory and
deliberative procedures, through which people come to trust their leaders and view
them as legitimate.
IV. STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING SOCIAL ORDER THROUGH LEGITIMACY
The key message of this article is that while command and control strategies
have value, they are overused in currents efforts to regulate. This is true both in
145. Mark W. Lipsey & Francis T. Cullen, The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: A Review of
Systematic Reviews, 3 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. ScL. 297, 300-01 (2007).
146. FREY, supra note 38, at 24-33.
147. Antoinette Louw, Surviving the Transition: Trends and Perceptions of Crime in South Africa, 41 Soc.
INDICATORS RES. 137, 149 (1997).
148. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
149. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a) (2012).
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the internal dynamics of companies and in the efforts of legal authorities to engage
in external regulation through laws. A strategy more consistent with existing social
science evidence about the factors shaping compliance with regulations should
place greater emphasis upon creating and maintaining legitimacy. Creating this
legitimacy requires both for-profit organizations and the government to use
procedures that the public will experience as fair in developing and implementing
rules governing rule-following as well as other aspects of work organizations,
such as discipline, pay, promotion, and grievance management. It is by creating a
climate of procedural justice that organizations can most effectively motivate
voluntary rule following.15 0
The second theme of this article is that the overextension of command and
control models based upon a faulty understanding of available evidence is con-
nected to the biases of people in positions of power. There are psychological
satisfactions associated with holding and exercising power that lead people to seek
such arrangements and resist their examination and change. Those psychological
processes have been outlined. The implication of their existence, however, is to
emphasize the need for independent review and empirical benchmarks. Given that
those exercising power are likely to justify, rather than reflect upon, their actions,
their use of discretionary authority needs to be subject to verification.
The implication of the literature on biases is consistent with the scientific
concept of blind studies. The literature recognizes that those doing an investiga-
tion of evidence have subtle and unconscious biases that lead them to look at the
evidence through the lens of their own prior views. This includes researchers and
others in positions of authority.15 ' Reviews need to be conducted by neutral
and uninvolved panels of experts of independent researchers to evaluate policies
and practices. This policy is already in place in the form of National Academy
of Science ("NAS") panels and efforts such as the Campbell collaborative, which
promote meta-analyses of the empirical literature on law. An example of an NAS
effort is the review of policing literature.152 Similarly, a Campbell collaborative
effort recently explored the influence of procedural justice in policing upon
attitudes and behaviors related to the law. 5 3 The hallmark of both efforts is an
attempt to develop empirically based policies and practices through a neutral and
independent review of what works. An analysis of the effectiveness of different
efforts to regulate white collar crime would be similarly benefited from such a
neutral and independent review.
150. TYLER & BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS, supra note 27, at 192-94; Tyler & Blader, Can Businesses
Effectively Regulate Employee Conduct?, supra note 27, at 1153-54.
151. See Findley & Scott, supra note 89, at 292.
152. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING (Wesley Skogan
& Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004).
153. See Lorraine Mazerolle et al., Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy: A Systematic Review of the
Research Evidence, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 245 (2013).
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